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d’idées appliquées dans un contexte local – par exemple,
dans le contexte canadien – émanent en fait de discussions
qui ont eu lieu au niveau international, sans participation
effective de ceux qui en sont finalement affectés. Si, à
présent, les états fonctionnent et formulent des politiques à
ce niveau-là, pourquoi ne devrions-nous pas préconiser
vigoureusement la création de systèmes de responsabilité
opérant également à ce même niveau.
Introduction
There is a tendency in refugee law to look hopefullyto Canada as a model of best practice. To manypeople in Canada, I have no doubt this might seem
odd. There is strong criticism of Canadian law and prac-
tice and concern about current proposals. What this opti-
mistic external gaze reflects, I suspect, is a level of despera-
tion among those in Europe who are appalled by state re-
sponses to refugees and asylum seekers. Within the Euro-
pean Union (eu), in particular, there exists a culture of the
lowest common denominator based on the idea that “If
everyone else in Europe is doing it, so can we,” or, “We are
doing this because it is the European norm.” In other words,
the focus is limited to other European states only. Anyone
who has practical experience of lobbying governments in
Europe on asylum law and policy (as I have with the Irish
government) will be able to relate to this. In despair one
looks for “life beyond Europe,” and Canada is usually cited
as the place to examine.
In a world still divided into states, the issue of how to
address forced displacement is a troubling one. For those
who are displaced, legal and political niceties take second
place to the immediate need for protection. At the core of
this protection is what I term in this essay “human secu-
rity.” The introduction of this term is not a tool to displace
rights discourse from refugee protection. Rather it is to for-
ward other values as important in the current debate about
the future of refugee law. This has become significant at a
time when refugees and asylum seekers, particularly in
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This essay explores the connection between discourses of
membership, and refugee and human rights law. The
argument is that state practice is often anchored in concep-
tions of democracy that refugee advocates must challenge at
a fundamental level. I am particularly interested in the
idea of human security. In addition, it is suggested that
although human rights law has an essential role to play, we
should not neglect the importance of refugee law as a
status-granting mechanism. In the end, specific problems in
refugee law call for progressive reform. For example, the
essay calls for serious engagement with the idea of interna-
tional or regional regulatory mechanisms to monitor state
practice in this area. Many of the ideas applied in domestic
contexts, such as the Canadian, come from international
discussions. These discussions are often removed from
effective participation. If states now function—and con-
struct policy—at this level, then why should we not strongly
advocate the creation of systems of accountability that
operate at this level also?
Résumé
Cet article explore la relation entre les discours sur l’appar-
tenance et la loi sur le droit d’asile et les droits de l’homme.
Le raisonnement utilisé est que la pratique des états est
souvent ancrée dans des concepts de démocratie que les
défenseurs du droit d’asile se doivent de remettre en ques-
tion. Je fais cela en relation avec l’idée de la sécurité humaine.
Additionellement, il est suggéré que bien que la loi sur les
droits de l’homme ait un rôle essentiel à jouer, nous ne
devrions pas négliger l’importance que la loi sur le droit
d’asile a à jouer en tant que mécanisme octroyant un
statut. En fin de compte, il faudra apporter des réformes
progressives touchant aux problèmes spécifiques de la loi sur
le droit d’asile. Par exemple, l’article réclame que soit
examinée sérieusement l’idée de mécanismes régulateurs au
niveau international ou régional pour faire le suivi de la
pratique des états dans ce domaine. Un grand nombre
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Europe, are being denied basic socio-economic rights.
These rights are still not accorded the recognition they de-
serve. In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the context from
which I am writing, this has become a pressing issue, as
governments have been willing to erode basic socio-
economic entitlements in a rather crude attempt to dis-
courage asylum seeking. This has included the withdrawal
of welfare benefits and now the construction of what can
only be described as an experiment in “social engineering”
to address the needs of destitute asylum seekers.1 The proc-
ess of asylum seeking has been regarded by many govern-
ments as problematic. Asylum seekers are “criminalized”
and routinely constructed as threats to the internal secu-
rity of the polity. This is now being supplemented with
welfare schemes that aim to make asylum-seeking appear
as an increasingly unattractive option.
The institution of asylum, as presently understood, is
centred upon those who have managed to cross a border.
The focus is primarily on external displacement. This is
the main concern of this essay. My aim here is to examine
the relationship between refugee and human rights law in
the U.K. context. It is now of more general interest, given
the decision of the Labour government to incorporate the
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 into domes-
tic law. The Human Rights Act 1998 entered into force
throughout the U.K. on October 2, 2000. Asylum law is
one of those areas where significant case-law is likely to
emerge. My intention in this essay is not simply to applaud
this overdue development; rather, I want to stress that we
require values to assess the impact of human rights law.
This is equally applicable in the Canadian context. In refu-
gee law we can talk of refugee protection principles, but I
suggest that the concept of human security is significant in
not only alerting us to the broad range of values that must
be respected, but also the continuing importance of refu-
gee law as a status-granting mechanism. In our understand-
able rush to embrace what human rights law has to offer,
there is reason to remain committed to the core values of
refugee protection anchored in an inclusive vision of the
1951 convention. Therefore, while the essay draws upon the
U.K. experience, it speaks also to more general debates in
refugee law and policy.
Refugee Law, Inclusion/Exclusion, and the
Construction of Membership and Belonging
The world may now be a smaller place for many people.
Globalization does not respect borders, and technological
developments have radically transformed our understand-
ing of time and space. But can we say this is a development
that brings universal benefit to all? We cannot. In practice,
the world has in fact become a more tightly regulated pub-
lic space for the marginalized. For those who do not pos-
sess the means, and who do not have the skills required by
affluent states, movement is far from free. Refugees and
asylum seekers wishing to enter the eu, for example, must
overcome ever higher hurdles. These containment prac-
tices can all be cloaked in the discourses of root causes and
prevention, but the fact remains: for many individuals and
groups, movement has never been so difficult as it is now.
This cannot be probed in any great depth here. But one
might speculate that as loss of autonomy becomes a major
anxiety of states, internal security and the regulation of
certain types of entry become more important. In a world
of risk this is an area where states perhaps believe they can,
either individually or collectively, continue to be assertive.
At a time when there is much optimistic talk of a new
cosmopolitan world order, or postnational forms of mem-
bership and belonging, the response to asylum seekers ap-
pears all very familiar. The reason for this goes much deeper
than the political will of states. It is tied fundamentally to
the principles that are constitutive of democratic polities.
While it is easy at the international level to focus on the
sheer political will of individual states, one must remain
aware of the reasons that states function in this way. There
is in fact a basis in understandings of democratic citizen-
ship for state practice. In other words, categories that have
progressive implications for some at the national level, no-
tably citizens, can have a negative impact on the treatment
of refugees and asylum seekers.
The idea of democratic citizenship remains connected
in many societies to the notion of self-determination. In
other words, that a political community has the right to
dictate the terms of its own governance. There is a long
history of republican thought that traces the whole idea of
democracy to its core in the right of a community to deter-
mine its own future. Rules on membership are a conse-
quence. A political community seeks not only the terms of
its own governance, but also to determine who will be in-
cluded. Rules that regulate membership spring from the
concept of internal self-determination.
There are, however, principles that some claim transcend
democratic citizenship. In earlier times it was to theology
that people looked for a “higher law” above and beyond
the state. In our pluralist and secular times, this will no
longer do as a rational explanation for values that are cen-
tred on personhood and not status. God may well be dead,
but now we have international law. International law re-
flects an expansive vision of human rights that attach to
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the person and not solely to the citizen. This focus can also
be found within some systems of constitutional rights pro-
tection.
The treatment of asylum seekers brings to the fore a ten-
sion between notions of democratic citizenship and
“borderless” strains of liberalism that are anchored in the
idea that rights attach to the person. One is a vision of a
world of states with flourishing democratic polities and
membership rules; the other is a blurred vision of free
movement and open borders. Many who work in refugee
law are understandably tempted by the latter model. It
seems to hold out the possibility of a more humane ap-
proach to asylum, but it can be illusive. In an international
community still largely divided into states, “borderless lib-
eralism” can appear out of touch with the realities of life in
democratic societies. And more troubling, it fails to an-
swer the complex issues that arise. My own view is that
scholars of refugee law need to engage with work in delib-
erative democracy in order to sketch an approach that
would present a real challenge to the current practices of
states.2 It would not be anchored solely in arguments about
universal human rights and would be prepared to take the
idea of a political democracy seriously. Viewed in this way,
refugee law continues to be an impressive tool for achiev-
ing humanitarian objectives when dealing with the plight
of some of the forcibly displaced.
Complementing Refugee Protection?
The previous section ended with rather an upbeat assess-
ment of the continuing potential of refugee law. This view
is not universally shared. In fact, one is more likely to hear
reference today to human rights law “coming to the res-
cue” of refugee law. As is well known, refugee law reflects a
particular approach to the idea of protecting the displaced.
It is a limited and partial response to a severe international
problem. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees reflects a compromise between the state impera-
tive of migration control and humanitarian concerns. One
can present this rather melodramatically as a legalistic ex-
ercise in exclusion, but this is only a partial account.
There are few areas of law that do not include and ex-
clude at precisely the same time. Refugee law would not be
the expression of a commitment to an exception to general
migration control concerns if it was not in an important
sense exclusionary. There are, however, more substantial
criticisms of refugee law. I will deal with two here. First,
refugee law confines protection to those with a “well-
founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.” As
we will see below, human rights law (in the form of the
European Convention on Human Rights) does not limit
protection to ill-treatment for a particular convention rea-
son. An extensive jurisprudence has evolved in refugee law
around what precisely it means to come within a conven-
tion reason. The debates are in essence familiar ones to le-
gal scholars. Some see little reason why refugee law should
not be progressively developed and constructively inter-
preted, while others (more attached to the intention of the
drafters) fear that states will simply abandon refugee law
entirely if pushed too far. The difficulty for the human rights
lawyer is that refugee law has clear limits inscribed in the
text of the convention. Creativity can take us far, but often
not as far as many would wish to go. The result is the co-
existence of a delimited understanding of refugee protec-
tion and a body of human rights law that on some occa-
sions goes beyond the protection offered by refugee law.
The second aspect of refugee law often criticized is its
exceptions, even to the most vital protections. The obvi-
ous example of this is article 33(2), but the exclusion clauses
in article 1 can be presented in a similar way. Refugee law
contains a concept of the deserving and undeserving per-
son,3 of which human rights lawyers tend to be suspicious
(although one can question such an approach after the re-
cent response of the human rights community to the Gen-
eral Pinochet case in the U.K.). It is with the exclusion
clauses that we can run into difficulties with arguments
about constructive interpretation. States now seem pre-
pared to be creative in their application of the exclusion
clauses in refugee law, in a way that departs from the spe-
cific aims of the provisions. As states become increasingly
concerned about their internal security, it is tempting for
them to make excessive use of these clauses. Human rights
law again can be presented as the solution by prohibiting
return in circumstances where it would be permissible in
refugee law.
Human rights law clearly has a role to play in comple-
menting refugee protection. But one should also recognize
the limitations. The standards that need to be met in hu-
man rights law are often higher than in refugee law. In ad-
dition, rules that prohibit return seldom deal with the cru-
cial issue of status. The reality is that many individuals and
groups are left in a form of legal limbo. The rise of the
informal status is one of the key features of the European
response to forced displacement. What this does in prac-
tice is promote human insecurity. Human rights lawyers
should be careful not to promote this culture of deformal-
ization in refugee protection. Status matters to the dis-
placed, and refugee law has the advantage of providing it,
with specific entitlements that attach to it. We should not
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abandon the struggle to ensure that full and effective use is
made of refugee law as it presently exists. There is much
unfinished business in refugee protection.
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and the U.K.’s Human
Rights Act 1998
If there are lessons from the U.K. context for Canada, then
they are primarily warnings about what can go wrong.
Problems with the system raise fundamental questions
about its practical operation. The latest legislative meas-
ure, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, follows a line
of similar legislation that has fostered a highly distinctive
approach to an area that until the 1990s had received little
attention from legislators. The other major event, and the
focus of this section, is the enactment of the Human Rights
Act 1998. This legislation incorporates significant aspects
of the European Convention on Human Rights into the
domestic law of the U.K.4 There was extensive debate on
which model of rights enforcement should be adopted. The
Canadian model was in the end rejected, and the govern-
ment opted for a more robust version of the New Zealand
model of rights protection. Courts and tribunals in the U.K.
are now under an obligation to interpret primary and sub-
ordinate legislation, as far as it is possible to do so compat-
ibly with convention rights.5 While subordinate legislation
can be struck down, the government decided not to give to
the courts the same power over primary legislation. On
primary legislation the struggles will be over finding inter-
pretations that are compatible with convention rights.
There will be occasions, however, when this is impossible.
In such circumstances, designated courts are permitted to
make a declaration of incompatibility.6 A declaration of
incompatibility does not render the relevant provision
invalid,7 but it may trigger a remedial order procedure
whereby Parliament can address the offending provision.8
While the government has stated that this is the likely re-
sult of a declaration of incompatibility, there is no guaran-
tee that the government will act. What the legislation ef-
fectively achieves is a delicate balance between parliamen-
tary democracy and the protection of human rights. The
suspicion is that designated courts will strain to find an
interpretation that fits with convention rights rather than
indulge excessively in declarations of incompatibility. How-
ever, at this stage it is difficult to predict how this will map
out in practice.
Asylum law is an area where much is expected of the
Human Rights Act. The European convention institutions
have shown a willingness to develop convention rights to
embrace the protection of refugees and asylum seekers.
When interpreting convention rights, courts and tribunals
in the U.K. are now obliged to consider the case-law of the
convention institutions.9 While they are not obliged to fol-
low it, the past approach is likely to be significant. Some of
the more important cases are worth considering here, for
they demonstrate precisely how human rights law can have
an impact on the protection of the displaced, but they also
indicate the limits of this area of law and policy.
The case of Soering v. UK10 is regarded as one of the more
important judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights. While this was an extradition case, the implications
of the judgment were clear for those seeking to protect asy-
lum seekers. The court held that the U.K. would violate
article 3 if it returned the applicant to face the “death row
phenomenon” in the U.S. The court, in this case, was only
following what was the established jurisprudence of the
European Commission of Human Rights. Although the
court extended the protection to include asylum seekers, it
has always made clear that the state has a right, as a matter
of well-established international law, to regulate the entry
and deportation of migrants subject to its convention ob-
ligations. The court, while prepared to extend the protec-
tion to a group not directly referred to in the convention,
has been cautious nevertheless. An individual must dem-
onstrate substantial grounds for believing that there is a
real risk of article 3 ill-treatment upon return.
The test is a stricter one than that applied in the context
of refugee law. This is evident in Vilvarajah v. UK,11 where
the difficulties of bringing a successful article 3 claim were
demonstrated. In this case the applicants were Sri Lankan
Tamils who had been returned. Their article 3 claim was
unsuccessful, even though they had been ill-treated again
when sent back. The court held that this was not reason-
ably foreseeable at the time the U.K. decided to return the
applicants. It relied to some extent on the experience of
the U.K. authorities in this area and on objective evidence
of an improvement in conditions. As to the plight of the
applicants, the court concluded that there was nothing to
distinguish their cases from others. In addition, the court
adopted a generous interpretation of judicial review in the
U.K. context in relation to the applicants’ article 13 claim.
This is not to argue that the court has been unwilling to
work at the boundaries of article 3. In Ahmed v. Austria,12
the court appeared to have little difficulty with the idea
that persecution could emanate from non-state agents, and
Chahal v. UK13 demonstrated the absolute nature of the
article 3 protection. At a time when many states were show-
ing concern about the political activities of asylum seekers,
the court made an important intervention by stressing that
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the behaviour of the individual is not a material factor; the
exclusive focus is on the risk of ill-treatment upon return.
In assessing this risk, the court has emphasized the impor-
tance of a rigorous and independent determination proc-
ess. In Jabari v. Turkey,14 the court held that a strict time-
limit for excluding asylum claims effectively denied access
to a rigorous determination process. This point is also evi-
dent in the rather different case of Amuur v. France,15 where
the court stated that confinement should not “deprive the
asylum seeker of the right to gain effective access to the
procedure for determining refugee status.”16 The court held
in this case that confinement of the applicants in the inter-
national zone, and at an airport hotel, constituted a viola-
tion of article 5(1). French law at the time was inadequate,
and the guidelines did not permit the domestic courts to
intervene effectively.
Article 8 is also relevant to the plight of refugees and
asylum seekers. Although there is much discussion of glo-
balization, states continue to be assertive in this area. The
state is alive and well in the areas of asylum and immigra-
tion law. Human rights law thus assumes an important
place in shaping and directing this instinct in humane di-
rections and in some cases preventing the state from act-
ing in the way it wishes to. Article 8 guarantees the right to
private and family life. It is often raised in deportation cases
where an individual has established family connections.17
Deportation becomes an option for states when the indi-
vidual has been involved in criminal activity, or other ac-
tion that triggers the process in domestic law.18 The Euro-
pean convention has been used to raise rights-based issues
in this process; in particular, whether the deportation ac-
tion is proportionate to the legitimate aim that is pursued
by the state. These cases involve difficult balancing exer-
cises, and the jurisprudence of the court is open to some
criticism for its lack of clarity. Nevertheless what it reveals
is that human rights law can have an impact in an area that
many states regard as central to the self-definition of the
modern state. In other words, the case-law of the Euro-
pean convention reveals that human rights law can have a
practical impact on the treatment of asylum seekers. It is
thus a valuable tool in the general struggle to secure refu-
gee protection principles.
The courts in the U.K. have an obligation to take the
jurisprudence into account, but there is no requirement
that they must follow it. This allows room for the progres-
sive development of convention rights. In the U.K. con-
text, this is likely to have a significant impact on asylum
law. The jurisprudence of the convention institutions re-
veals the impact that human rights law can have. However,
it also shows the gap in monitoring at the heart of refugee
and asylum law. While there is little doubt that the existing
human rights bodies can fulfill a useful function in pro-
viding an international form of redress for asylum seekers,
it is worth considering a dedicated monitoring mechanism
for refugee law. As the unhcr embarks on a global consul-
tation, it is now time to introduce the idea of international
forms of regulation of state practice (I would put it as
strongly as that) into the area of refugee law. Human rights
law and institutions can, as I have noted, play their part.
However, this should not become an excuse to avoid the
difficult task of renewing refugee law and practice. In this
process of renewal we should not exclude the idea of sub-
stantial institutional reform at the international level.
Conclusion
This is an important time in the debate on refugee law. It is
generally accepted that states are pursuing an agenda of
restriction. Canada, so often looked to as an example of
good practice, seems to be following this depressing inter-
national trend. How do we counter this? The challenge is
to make use of the existing tools to struggle to secure de-
cent treatment for refugees and asylum seekers, while pre-
senting an alternative narrative to the dominant logic in
the international community at present. Human rights law
can play a part. The European Convention on Human
Rights has been an important tool for asylum seekers in
Europe. However, refugee lawyers must fundamentally re-
think their own subject in order to ensure not only that it
is revitalized but that it is relevant to the changing dynam-
ics of the international community and international forms
of regulation. There is a need for sustained dialogue about
how this can be achieved. In this dialogue we must be care-
ful to protect what we as refugee lawyers have achieved al-
ready, but we should not be afraid to advance models of
protection that would guarantee better treatment for the
displaced. In particular, there is a pressing need for a form
of regulation of national practices that operates at the in-
ternational or regional level. If anything, this would take
the pressure off the human rights mechanisms and ease
concerns about the current lack of uniformity in applica-
tion. Refugee law can be made to work. However, we should
not rule out progressive reform. The struggle is to find those
willing to act as advocates for a different vision of refugee
protection and then to make sure that their voices are heard.
The unhcr has a leading role to play in ensuring that this
happens at the national, regional, and international levels.
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